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This paper analyzes the determinants of CDS spreads of major in- 
ternational banks using the data period of 2005~2009, which includes 
the global financial crisis. Taking into account that CDS spreads of 
Korean banks, for example, rose sharply although they were finan- 
cially solid preceding the crisis period, we consider macroeconomic 
variables that reflect the economic fundamentals and foreign liquidity 
conditions of the economy, in addition to the financial indicators of 
banks. Empirical results, based on a panel regression analysis of 40 
major international banks, shows that macroeconomic variables such 
as the fiscal balance, foreign reserves, foreign exposure, and financial 
indicators such as bank’s capital, loan-to-asset ratio, and loan-to- 
deposit ratio matter significantly in determining banks’ CDS spreads. 
The results also show that certain variables became significant during 
the crisis period, which implies that it is important to manage and 
monitor certain variables during such periods.
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I. Introduction
CDS spreads of Korean banks leveled below 100bps until the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers and then rose significantly to more than 400bps by 
the end of 2008. The sharp rise implied increased credit risks at banks, 
and overall foreign liquidity conditions deteriorated quickly as a result. 
Although the financial indicators of Korean banks, such as financial 
soundness, profitability, and capital adequacy, were in good shape relative 
to major international banks, the increase in CDS spreads of the Korean 
banks outpaced that of these major international banks. This implies 
that the determinants of CDS spreads are not limited to micro factors 
such as the financial conditions of the issuer of the underlying asset, 
but extend to macro factors such as the degree of systemic risk of the 
financial system, the government’s external liabilities and the soundness 
of the foreign exchange sector. 
This paper attempts to identify exactly what those factors are. Although 
there have been numerous studies trying to identify the determinants of 
sovereign credit spreads, it is to our understanding that there has been 
little exploration into identifying the determinants of banks’ CDS spreads. 
The reasons behind this could be various, but our main speculation is 
that since CDS trading, which falls in the category of credit derivatives, 
is a relatively new product compared to other financial derivatives and 
trades mainly over-the-counter, researchers might have had difficulty in 
acquiring data for analysis.
This paper analyzes the determinants of banks’ CDS spreads and, in 
particular, tries to find out why Korean banks CDS spreads rose sharply 
during the global financial crisis, despite their solid financial conditions. 
This differs from previous studies, especially those on corporate CDS 
spreads, where market indicators such as stock prices and credit ratings 
were the main area of focus. Analyzing the effects of macroeconomic 
variables in addition to the micro financial indicators of banks enables 
us to study the policy implications of the empirical findings. The inclusion 
of micro financial indicators such as the loan to asset ratio, the loan to 
deposit ratio, and Tier 1 capital into the analysis gives us a much richer 
and broader view of the uniqueness that can be found only within the 
financial industry. Also, by studying the effects of a crisis event (i.e., the 
global financial crisis) we can investigate the effects of a possible shift 
in investors’ credit risk appetite due to a crisis. 
The paper is organized as follows. First, we briefly review the literature 
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on CDS spread determinants and distinguish our research from earlier 
studies. Second, we present the model specification for our empirical 
analysis. Third, an empirical analysis based on a panel regression is 
carried out and the results are interpreted. Last, we conclude our paper 
and derive policy implications. 
II. Literature Review
As mentioned above, the literature on studying the determinants of 
CDS spreads is limited by the relatively short history of CDS trading. 
We split the literature on determinants of CDS spreads into studies on 
sovereign CDS spreads and studies on corporate CDS spreads.
A. Literature on Sovereign CDS Spreads
There is little research directly dealing with the determinants of sov- 
ereign CDS, instead focusing on the determinants of credit spreads of 
sovereign bonds. Park and Seo (2006) analyze the determinants of credit 
spreads of 16 emerging market countries using panel data. They found 
that variables such as gross debt, external debt repayment, and real GDP 
exhibit high significance whereas the CPI and US Treasury rates were 
less significant. Eichengreen and Mody (1998) used a data set consisting 
of 1,033 launch spreads from 1991 to 1996 and found that launch 
spreads are more sensitive to market sentiment than economic funda- 
mentals. Grandes (2002) analyzed the sovereign credit spreads of Argentina, 
Chile, and Mexico between 1994~2000 and concluded that credit spreads 
were more sensitive to permanent effects rather than transitory effects. 
Kamin and von Kleist (1999) focused on the regional differences in emerg- 
ing market credit spreads. Using the data period of 1991 to 1997, they 
found that investors put a premium on sovereign credit spreads from 
South American and Eastern European countries over Asian or middle 
eastern countries. They argue that even after taking into account the rele- 
vant country’s alleviated risk factor, improved credit ratings and changes 
in the maturity structure, credit spreads cannot be fully explained with- 
out the regional factor. Aizenman and Pasricha (2009) showed, using a 
data set of 19 countries, that the credit spreads of countries which en- 
tered into swap agreements with the Federal Reserve were lower than 
those of countries that didn’t; they also argued that a higher foreign re- 
serves to GDP ratio translates into lower CDS spreads.
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B. Literature on Corporate CDS Spreads
The CDS is typically used to hedge the credit risk of corporations so 
research on corporate CDS spreads is relatively abundant. Academic re- 
search on CDS spreads was pioneered by Duffie (1999). Duffie (1999) 
argued that due to arbitrage, CDS spreads and corporate credit spreads 
should be identical. That is, if a bond investor enters into a CDS con- 
tract for the same underlying asset, then the corporate yield subtracted 
by the CDS spread should equal the risk-free interest rate since the 
credit risk has been perfectly hedged by the CDS contract. This implies 
that CDS spreads should be identical to corporate credit spreads, which 
came to be known as ‘Duffie's parity.’ Subsequent literature on CDS 
spreads therefore focused on empirically verifying ‘Duffie's parity,’ but 
studies found that there exists a significant discrepancy between CDS 
spreads and corporate credit spreads. For example, Houweling and Vorst 
(2005) reported that there is a statistically significant and persistent 
discrepancy between CDS spreads and corporate credit spreads and 
that CDS spreads should be estimated utilizing individual firms’ hazard 
rates and recovery rates rather than corporate credit spreads. Blanco, 
Brennan, and Marsh (2005), on the other hand, stretched the data 
sample period, and found that ‘Duffie's parity’ held in the long run. Fur- 
thermore, they discovered that corporate credit spreads were sensitive 
to economy-wide variables such as interest rates and stock indices, 
whereas CDS spreads were more prone to movements in individual firms’ 
stock prices.
The literature on the determinants of CDS spreads began with Zhang, 
Zhou, and Zhu (2005). Noting that ‘Duffie's parity’ should hold, they 
based their analysis on Merton’s (1974) model of corporate yield deter- 
mination. Alexander and Kaeck (2008) pointed out that, since the out- 
standing amount of individual firms’ CDS contracts is relatively low, there 
is a liquidity premium reflected in the CDS spreads. Based on iTraxx, 
Europe’s CDS index, they found that the CDS index is positively cor- 
related with stock market volatility when the stock market is unstable, 
and is affected negatively by the stock market and interest rate changes 
when the stock market is stable.
C. Comparison with Previous Research
Most previous studies of CDS spreads have concentrated on the indivi- 
dual characteristics of the firm, while this paper takes into consideration 
the macroeconomic variables. Analyzing the determinants of CDS spreads 
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is mostly based on Merton’s (1974) model of corporate yield determination 
and therefore the focus has been concentrated mainly on variables re- 
lated to the credit risk of the firm. This paper, on the other hand, in- 
cludes variables such as per capita GDP, GDP growth, foreign reserves, 
and the fiscal balance, which are also relevant to the CDS spread since 
macro conditions also affect the individual firm’s probability of default. 
This is particularly important for firms in emerging markets since sover- 
eign risk plays a bigger role. 
Also, this paper focuses on banks’ CDS spreads. It is our understand- 
ing that there is no previous research that deals with the determinants 
of banks. The banking industry is particularly fertile for research because 
variables that cannot be found in other industries, such as Tier 1 cap- 
ital, the loan to asset ratio, and the loan to deposit ratio, can be in- 
cluded in the analysis. Their inclusion enables us to study the man- 
agerial implications of CDS spreads movements, since CDS spreads tend 
to exhibit large swings in turbulent periods. 
Also, including macroeconomic variables allows this paper to offer 
policy implications for stabilizing CDS spreads. This aspect has been 
neglected in previous work, which has mostly focused on the pricing 
aspect of CDS spreads.
Lastly, this paper considers the possibility that a regime shift might 
have occurred during the global financial crisis. Due to an extreme li- 
quidity shortage and default possibilities, counterparty risk became a 
major concern in CDS trading, and trading dropped to half of usual 
volume. Therefore, it is highly possible that the more conservative risk 




We formulate a panel regression model, with a sample size of 680, for 
a comprehensive study on the determinants of CDS spreads of 40 banks 
in 16 countries from the first quarter of 2005 to that of 2009. We ex- 
amine the macroeconomic indicators of each bank’s home country as 
well as the financial conditions of each bank as independent variables. 
In addition, a paradigm shift is considered to account for the sudden 
increase in CDS spreads after the bankruptcy filing of Lehman Brothers. 
We incorporate this by using dummy variables representing the financial 
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crisis and formulate an interaction term of the dummy variable and re- 
levant independent variables. The estimated model is set up as follows.
yit＝β0＋Xi’t β1＋Zc’t β2＋Dt․Xi’t β3＋Dt․Zct β4＋αi＋εit          (1)
In Equation (1), the dependent variable yit represents the CDS spread 
for bank i in period t, and Xit consists of financial variables of bank i in 
period t. Zct is an independent variable vector that considers the macro- 
economic conditions of home country c in period t. Dt has a value of 1 
if t falls between the third quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009, 
otherwise 0. α i represents the unobservable characteristics of a bank 
such as organizational culture and brand value. Dt․Xit is the interaction 
term between the financial crisis dummy variable and an independent 
variable of bank i, while Dt․Zct is the interaction term between financial 
crisis dummy variable and an independent variable of home country c. 
Therefore, β1 and β2 demonstrate the change in the CDS spread in 
response to a change in Xit and Zct, respectively, before the global finan- 
cial crisis (Dt＝0). In contrast, β1＋β 3 and β2＋β4 represent the impacts 
of Xit and Zct on CDS spreads after the fall of Lehman Brothers (Dt＝1), 
as shown in the following equation.
       yit＝β0＋Xi’t β1＋Zc’t β2＋αi＋εit (if Dt＝0)
 (2)
        ＝β0＋Xi’t (β1＋β3)＋Zc’t (β2＋β4)＋αi＋εit (if Dt＝1)
　　　
For a panel estimation of Equation (2), a random effects or fixed effects 
model can be utilized to account for αi. A random effects model assumes 
that αi and Xit are independent (E (αi|X )＝0) and performs an OLS esti- 
mation using the variance of the error term. In the case of a fixed effects 
model, OLS is applied to Equation (3) after subtracting the mean without 
any assumption regarding the relationship between the unobserved vari- 
able α i and the observed variables. 
   yit－y̅i＝(Xit－X̅i)β＋(uit－u̅i)                       (3)
Where X̅i represents the time average of Xit.
The Wu-Hausman Test examines the null hypothesis that α i and Xit 
are independent to help decide which model should be used for esti- 
mation. If the null hypothesis is rejected, the random effects estimation 
would be biased. If not, one should check which of the two estimations 
is more efficient. In our study, the Wu-Hausman test results rejected 
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the null hypothesis and thus we only provide the results of the fixed 
effects panel estimation. 
IV. Empirical Results
A. Main Results
This paper analyzes the impact of macroeconomic variables and bank- 
specific variables on banks’ CDS spreads. Empirical results show that 
macroeconomic variables have more explanatory power on banks’ CDS 
spreads. Table 1 shows the regression results of the single-paradigm (pa- 
radigm shift after the collapse of Lehman Brothers not considered) fixed 
effects model estimation. The estimation with only macroeconomic vari- 
ables (model 1) shows greater explanatory power (R
2＝0.7194) than the 
analysis (model 2) using bank-specific variables alone (R
2＝0.5404). When 
both macroeconomic and bank-specific variables were taken into account, 
as in model 3, the number of statistically significant macroeconomic vari- 
ables (5) is larger than that of bank-specific variables (2). 
The results in Table 1 show that variables such as GDP per capita, 
GDP growth rate, FX reserves, foreign exposure, FX volatility, asset 
growth, and the Lehman collapse dummy are statistically significant. 
Since developed countries tend to have better credit ratings, we expect 
the coefficient of GDP per capita to be negative. But the results show 
that there is a positive relationship between GDP per capita and CDS 
spreads. Most countries in the sample are developed countries, so this 
might have resulted in the poor negative link between the two variables. 
The positive relationship may stem from the fact that most of the banks 
in our sample are from developed countries where CDS trading was 
prevalent, and therefore that the heightened credit risk resulted in the 
surge in CDS spreads.
We expected the coefficient of asset growth to be positive from en- 
hanced competition, though M&A and aggressive marketing can raise 
concerns related to credit risk problems. However, asset growth and 
CDS spreads were found to have a negative correlation. This may stem 
from the fact that CDS spreads affect asset growth as well. For example, 
banks suffering from high CDS spreads will have trouble expanding in 
size due to funding costs. 
Coefficients of other variables have the expected signs. High GDP 
growth implies the economy is in a boom phase, so banks from such 
countries tend to have less probability of default. Central banks with 




Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value
GDP/capita (-) 81.7*** 4.05
N/A
87.2*** 3.75
GDP growth (?) -11.9*** -6.86 -11.9*** -6.74
FX reserves (-) -1.0*** -12.87 -1.1*** -12.13
Foreign 
exposure
(+) 0.1*** 1.90 0.1*** 2.06
Fiscal balance (-) -2.5*** -1.77 -2.2*** -1.54
Current 
balance
(-) 1.2*** 1.36 1.2*** 1.39
FX volatility (+) 0.5*** 5.87 0.5*** 5.71
Interest rate (?) -1.2*** -0.19 -2.3*** -0.36
Term spread (-) 8.13** 1.24 8.5*** 1.28
Log (Tier 1) (-)
N/A
20.8*** 3.44 -2.5*** -0.44
Asset growth (+) -0.5*** -2.21 -0.4*** -2.23
ROA (-) -10.3*** -1.10 1.6*** 0.21
Loan/asset (-) -1.1*** -1.45 0.1*** 0.23
Loan/deposit (+) 0.7*** 3.09 -0.2*** -0.8
Lehman 
collapse
(+) 33.6*** 3.88 140.1*** 20.85 34.7*** 3.91
Sample Size 680 680 680
R2 0.7194 0.5404 0.7221
Note: * denotes that the coefficient is significant at the 10% significance level, 
** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
TABLE 1
RESULTS OF SINGLE-PARADIGM FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION
larger FX reserves have more room to bail out banks in trouble, and 
hence show lower CDS spreads. Countries with larger foreign exposure 
have a higher tendency to suffer from shortages in foreign liquidity, as 
Korea experienced during the global financial crisis, so foreign exposure 
and CDS spreads have a positive correlation. High FX volatility usually 
implies greater risk of a shortage of foreign liquidity, and therefore coun- 
tries with high FX volatility should have higher CDS spreads. The CDS 
spreads of banks soared dramatically after the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers, so the coefficient of the dummy variable should have a positive 
sign.
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In fact, the magnitude and statistical significance of the Lehman col- 
lapse dummy variable has led us to consider the possibility that the 
Lehman Brothers bankruptcy may have caused a paradigm shift in pri- 
cing banks’ CDS spreads. Specifically, CDS investors may have changed 
their views on the risk profile of banks such that banks’ CDS spreads 
are determined by a different mechanism than before. Therefore we have 
included interaction terms between the Lehman collapse dummy and all 
other independent variables. Overall, when micro financial indicators and 
macroeconomic variables are both incorporated (Model 3) not all of the 
variables are significant. This may be because certain variables capture 
the relevant information of others. Given that the overall R-squared of the 
regression is high enough to suggest that the model is well specified, 
rather than a model misspecification, we think a richer specification can 
provide more interesting policy implications.
The results in Table 2 show that the effect of most variables changes 
after the global financial crisis. Most coefficients simply changed in ma- 
gnitude and statistical significance, but some even changed signs. Note 
that the correlation coefficient is β1 or β2 before the Lehman Brothers 
collapse and then changes to β1＋β 3 or β2＋β4 after the event. It is also 
the case that each coefficient is treated as zero when it is statistically 
insignificant. The last column in Table 2 shows the correlation after the 
crisis.1
The coefficient of GDP per capita is positive before the crisis, but it 
changes sign afterwards. This signals that CDS investors perceived fol- 
lowing the crisis that banks in more developed countries are less likely 
to go bankrupt. This is partly from the fact that the ‘ flight to quality’ 
during the global financial crisis made it harder for banks from less 
developed countries to roll over their debentures. It may also reflect the 
fact that the governments of more developed countries, such as the US, 
bailed out most of their large banks. Note that small and medium sized 
banks are not included in our sample, as we focused our attention on 
the 100 largest banks globally.
The coefficients for GDP growth, FX reserves, foreign exposure, and 
interest rate remain qualitatively similar to the single-paradigm estimation 
results. And coefficients for the term spread and ROA are statistically 
1 Coefficients shown in the last column reflect the significance of the interac- 
tion term. That is, when the interaction term is insignificant, the coefficient of the 
independent variable for the post-crisis effect is identical to the coefficient of the 
independent variable for the pre-crisis effect.




Pre-Crisis Effect Interaction Term Post-Crisis 














































































































Note: * denotes that the coefficient is significant at the 10% significance level, 
** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
TABLE 2
RESULT OF MULTI-PARADIGM FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION
insignificant, as in the single-paradigm analysis. 
The coefficient of fiscal balance became significant in the multi- 
paradigm analysis, and changes sign after the crisis. Before the crisis, 
sound fiscal balances were correlated with lower CDS spreads because 
fiscally stronger governments have more resources to support their banks 
in times of trouble. However, shakier fiscal balances are correlated with 
lower CDS spreads after the crisis. This may be due to the fact that the 
flight to quality made banks from highly developed countries have rela- 
tively lower CDS spreads, even though those countries, such as the US 
and Japan, had the worst fiscal budget conditions (positive correlation 
between current account balance and CDS spreads after the crisis may 
be explained in a similar fashion, except that Japan is not an appro- 
priate example). It may also be the case that banks from countries with 
bad fiscal balances received more funding from the government such 
that a worsening in the fiscal balance actually lowered CDS spreads. 
FX volatility negatively affects CDS spreads before the crisis, but it 
suddenly changes direction after the crisis. We still believe that the vol- 
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atility of currency has a negative impact on banks’ viability, but the coef- 
ficient may show unexpected signs due to collinearity with GDP per ca- 
pita. The correlation between FX volatility and GDP per capita is -50.98 
with statistical significance. 
Long-term interest rates show a negative correlation with CDS spreads. 
Higher interest rate may increase the default likelihood of banks due to 
an increase in the interest burden of their debtors. However, low interest 
rates may increase systemic risk due to asset bubbles. The negative cor- 
relation can be interpreted as evidence that the world economy suffered 
more from low interest rates than high interest rates during the sample 
period. The asset size of banks had nothing to do with CDS spreads 
before the crisis, but suddenly showed a strong negative correlation after- 
wards. This may imply that bailing out the largest banks in each coun- 
try led investors to believe in too-big-to-fail after the crisis. 
Bank's debt-to-assets ratio had no effect on CDS spreads before the 
crisis, but had a negative correlation after the crisis. This implies that 
CDS investors realized that banks with a stronger retail base are safer 
than banks focusing on investment banking. The loan to deposit ratio 
used to have a negative correlation with CDS spreads, but the effect 
wears out after the crisis. Since banks with more loan opportunities 
tended to have a higher loan to deposit ratio, the loan to deposit ratio 
was negatively correlated with CDS spreads. But CDS investors learned 
the importance of retail funding from the Northern Rock experience, so 
the negative correlation disappears afterwards. 
B. Robustness of Results
This study finds that banks’ CDS spreads depend more on macroe- 
conomic variables than the business performance of banks. However, it 
is not clear if this is because of the fact that banks’ default risk is re- 
lated to their home countries’ default risk or that banks’ default risk itself 
depends on macroeconomic factors. Therefore, further analysis is per- 
formed to see if banks’ CDS spreads is affected by macroeconomic vari- 
ables after we separate default risk of banks from that of their home 
countries.
To separate country CDS spreads from banks’ CDS spreads, we first 
estimate the Equation (4):
        CDSit＝β0＋β1NCDSit＋α i＋εit                   (4)
where NCDSit represents the CDS spread of the home country.




Pre-Crisis Effect Interaction Term Post-Crisis 














































































































Note: * denotes that the coefficient is significant at the 10% significance level, 
** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
TABLE 3
RESULT OF MULTI-PARADIGM FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION 
ON THE ERROR TERM
Then we calculate the estimated value of itCDS  using β ̂0, β ̂1, and α ̂i 
as in Equation (5) below. 
 itCDS ＝β ̂0＋β ̂1NCDSit＋α ̂i                     (5)
Since itCDS  represents the value of bank i’s CDS spreads in period t 
explained by the CDS spreads of its home country, the difference bet- 
ween       and CDSit denotes the portion of banks’ CDS spreads that 
cannot be explained by their home countries’ default risk. Therefore, we 
define eit as banks’ default risk premium unrelated to home countries’ 
default risk as in Equation (6):
 eit＝CDSit－ itCDS                        (6)
Afterwards, we run a multi-paradigm fixed effects panel regression on 
itCDS
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Variables
Macro only Micro only
Pre-Crisis Interaction Pre-Crisis Interaction
GDP/capita 121.8*** -262.3***   
GDP growth -10.7*** 3.4***   
FX reserves -0.5*** -1.1***   
Foreign exposure 0.3*** -0.1***   
Fiscal balance -6.6*** 12.9***   
Current balance -0.2*** 5.4***   
FX volatility 1.0*** -0.9***   
Interest rate -12.5*** -25.7***   
Term spread 12.6*** -8.1***   
Log (Tier 1)   22.5*** -37.0***
Asset growth   -0.2*** -0.4***
ROA   -58.1*** 60.0***
Loan/asset   -1.0*** -0.1***
Loan/deposit   0.6*** 0.3***
Lehman collapse 3069.8***  467.6***
sample size 680
R2 0.8203 0.6002
Note: * denotes that the coefficient is significant at the 10% significance level, 
** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
TABLE 4
RESULTS OF MULTI-PARADIGM SINGLE-FACET FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATION
eit, as in Equation (7). Note that it was not possible to retrieve CDS 
spreads data for India (ICICI Bank), Holland (ING Bank), Swiss (Credit 
Suisse, UBS) or the UK (RBS, Barclays, HBOS, Lloyds TSB, Standard 
Chartered), so the sample size was reduced to 527.
 eit＝β0＋Xi’t β1＋Zc’t β2＋Dt․Xi’t β3＋Dt․Zct β4＋αi＋εit           (7)
The results in Table 3 suggest that macroeconomic variables remain more 
important than bank-specific variables, even after we separate home coun- 
try risk from bank risk. This implies that banks’ default risk itself de- 
pends more on home countries’ macroeconomic factors. 
Our analysis also shows that macroeconomic variables such as GDP 
and GDP growth are relatively more important in understanding CDS 
movements than financial indicators from individual banks. Also, it is 
ascertained that the effects of these variables change significantly during 
the global financial crisis. Thus, it would be necessary to check if the 
relative importance between macroeconomic and microeconomic variables 
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continues to hold in the multi-paradigm model. 
Results in Table 4 show that macroeconomic variables have still more 
explanatory power in the multi-paradigm setting. The R
2 of estimation 
using macroeconomic variables is 0.8203, and that of bank financial in- 
dicators is only 0.6002. Moreover, 8 out of 9 macroeconomic variables 
have a statistically significant coefficient, whereas this is true for only 3 
out of 5 of the microeconomic variables.
Multicollinearity problems may arise when independent variables show 
high correlation with statistical significance. There is no defined standard 
in determining multicollinearity, but an absolute value exceeding 0.8 may 
cause trouble. GDP per capita and foreign exchange reserves exhibit the 
highest correlation, at -0.8423. However, the two variables cannot be 
replaced by other measures. 
Lastly, country dummies were also constructed to check if there are 
more country specific factors that need to be controlled for in the regres- 
sion. However, none of the country dummies were statistically significant.
V. Conclusion and Policy Implications
This paper analyzed the determinants of CDS spreads of major inter- 
national banks. The empirical findings show that macroeconomic vari- 
ables and external variables, rather than banks’ financial indicators, such 
as GDP, GDP growth, the fiscal balance, the current account, foreign 
reserves, and foreign exposure are major determinants of banks’ CDS 
spreads. It is worthwhile to note the significance of the fiscal balance to 
the GDP ratio variable, since it implies that the recent increase in Korea’s 
public debt should be managed prudently in order to avoid any instabil- 
ity in CDS spreads. Recent concerns by foreign investors on Korea’s rise 
in public debt can be perceived along this line. Also, higher foreign re- 
serves to short term debt and less foreign exposure measured by out- 
standing foreign currency denominated bond issuance both contribute 
to CDS spread stabilization, implying that foreign reserves accumulation 
and limits on foreign exposure is important. Since foreign exposure is 
linked with overall foreign debt exposure, this underlines the importance 
of external debt management by the government. 
Among market indicators, exchange rate volatility mattered in the pre- 
crisis period but was less significant during the crisis period. This may 
be due to the fact that other variables are incorporating shifts in ex- 
change rate volatility during the crisis period. Long term interest rates 






















































































































































































































































Note: Shaded area represents that the correlation is statistically significant 
at the 5% level.
TABLE 5
CORRELATION ANALYSIS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
showed a negative relationship with CDS spreads implying lower interest 
rates may be acknowledged as a signal of increased credit risk. Among 
banks’ financial indicators, the loan to asset ratio, loan to deposit ratio, 
and Tier 1 capital affected CDS spreads, underlining the importance of 
managing these variables to stabilize CDS spreads. 
Overall, this paper stresses the fact that the credit risk of major in- 
ternational banks, measured by their CDS spreads, is more dependent 
on macroeconomic variables than individual financial indicators. This 
implies that maintaining a sound macroeconomic environment is crucial 
for the stabilization of banks’ CDS spreads. Also the change of signs of 
SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS590
certain variables during the crisis period indicates that movements of 
certain variables should be well monitored. A change in the significance 
of specific variables (i.e., insignificant during normal times, but significant 
during crisis) also underlines the importance of managing specific vari- 
ables, especially during turbulent markets. 
(Received 4 October 2010; Revised 10 January 2011; Accepted 11 
January 2011)
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